

MR. DAVIS - 17 May 71

MR. WATTLES *PW* 7 MAY 1971

MR. COFFEY 2 JUL 1971

RE 3 F&G - I HAVE ASKED
D/PERS & D/YR FOR A REPORT
ON THEIR RECBAT SESSION
WITH MNC.

MORI/CDF Pages 15,
16, & 17

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10 May 1971
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Activities of the Management Advisory Group,
June 1970 - May 1971

1. This memorandum summarizes the activities of the Management Advisory Group during its second year of existence.

2. MAG's second year witnessed the gradual replacement of the entire original group with new members from the four Directorates and the Office of the Director. MAG met as a group approximately twice monthly during the year. Guest speakers included the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Executive Director-Comptroller, and Messrs. Coffey, Proctor, Maurv, Lundahl, John Clarke, [REDACTED] 25X1

3. Papers and recommendations on a variety of Agency problems were forwarded to the Executive Director-Comptroller during the year. Some of these were MAG initiated, while others were responses to issues raised by Agency management. They are summarized below: 25X1

- a. Agency-Wide Selection-Out Procedures. Some form of periodic review and selection-out procedure should be adopted Agency-wide in order to systematically cull out substandard and marginal employees. This is needed to maintain the health of the Agency and provide room for talented newcomers (Tab A).
- b. The Agency's Image. The image of the Agency is determined mainly by the quality of its work and no amount of public relations can overcome a lessening of that quality. A balance sheet on the Agency's image shows our relations with Congress, the White House, and the business community on the plus side; additionally the number of unsolicited professional applications remains well above our hiring capacity. On the debit side, there is difficulty in recruiting on college campuses, a need exists for

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improved relations with the State and
Defense Departments, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and there is general public ignorance about intelligence and CIA. We endorse the policy of maintaining a low Agency profile. But we also believe that it would be prudent and possible to build public knowledge and acceptance of the intelligence profession and of CIA's role in government through a program of "institutional advertising." MAG notes with satisfaction the highly successful speech by the Director to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April 1971. We particularly welcome this event in view of our recommendation last year that efforts to improve the Agency's image might include speaking engagements by the Director. This and other recommendations are spelled out in Tab B.

- c. MAG Reaction to Macomber Report, Diplomacy for the '70's. MAG did not consider it feasible or necessary to undertake a comprehensive critique of the Macomber report. Instead, we recognize its relevance to certain Agency problems and have considered it in our studies of common or parallel issues.
- d. The Agency's Supervision and Management Courses. Changes in the Agency's supervision and management courses proposed by OTR were found to encompass MAG thinking to a great extent. Specifically, MAG strongly endorses proposals to merge the present two courses on supervision and management, to require basic supervisory training for new supervisors within six months before or after their initial supervisory assignment, and to continue the education of supervisory personnel with a series of course seminars dealing with practical problems. We further accept an OTR suggestion that MAG act as an advisory body on course content, but propose that all Agency managers be encouraged to contribute to what OTR is teaching its new and potential managers (Tab C).

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- e. Lengthening the Probationary Period for New Employees. MAG believes that one year is clearly too short a probationary period for staff employees to prove themselves and for the Agency to judge satisfactorily their suitability for career status. We do not think that hiring new employees under contract status is a solution because it would put us at a hiring disadvantage. Instead, MAG recommends adopting a five-year probationary period with rigorous competitive weeding-out of marginal employees at the end of the third and fifth years (Tab D). Such a system could benefit both the Agency and the misplaced employee fairly early in his career. In response the Director of Personnel has recently discussed before MAG various aspects of the problem. We anticipate still further talks with the Office of Personnel.
- f. Reexamination of the CT Program. MAG believes there is good evidence that the CT Program has outlived its usefulness. It is not producing the sort of officer needed by the CS and it fosters elitism and exaggerated expectations which too often result in disillusionment. MAG urged that hiring decisions be better shared with the Directorates and that training be more closely tied to job progression (Tab E). In response to this the Director of Training has directly briefed MAG in detail on all aspects of the CTP. This indicated that many of our points have already been incorporated by OTR, and that MAG perhaps should examine further the relationship of the CS to the CTP.
- g. Agency Organization/Reorganization. Some realignment of internal Agency organization is needed. But first we think that the DCI must take action to bring about more effective and efficient management of national intelligence programs and resources. Granted this is a formidable task, but it is an urgent one given current program scope, costs, manpower levels and attendant inefficiencies on one hand, and the nation's changing domestic priorities and

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demands on the other. We believe that the authority exists and the time is right for bold action to bring the intelligence community under more centralized control. Specific recommendations are in Tab F.

Within the Agency, MAG proposes a more functional organization--a directorate for production and analysis, a directorate for collection, a directorate for support, and a directorate for the clandestine service which is essentially the same as the present DDP. The functions of the current DDS&T would be redistributed among these four major components. Detailed proposals for inter- and intra-directorate organization may also be found in Tab F.

- h. Removal of Security Barriers at Headquarters. MAG believes that the CODEWORD barriers in the Headquarters Building are no longer the best system for protecting CODEWORD material. They are inefficient, costly to operate, a safety hazard and a hindrance to communication. Studies by the Office of Security and by the Building Security Committee have recommended that the barriers be eliminated and replaced with compartmented areas. MAG believes these recommendations are in the best interest of the Agency and should be put into effect (Tab G). The DDS has asked the Office of Security for a plan within 45 days to accomplish objectives sought by these recommendations.

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- i. A Paper Concerning CIA [] Activities.

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4. In early March MAG held a two-day session at [] for the purpose of discussing MAG's philosophy, its problems, and ongoing projects. Eight of fourteen regular members and one previous member were in attendance. The meeting took place roughly one month following completion of the first full turnover of MAG membership. Highlights of the session were as follows:

- a. MAG took steps to make its existence and purpose more widely known through a Headquarters Notice (Tab H). This decision reflected a change in philosophy from the original group and was in

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part brought about by a desire of the present group to solicit ideas and suggestions from the Agency at large. In addition, MAG decided to seek suggestions from mid-careerists while they were in their course.

- b. The problem of mediocre attendance at MAG functions (8 to 10 out of 14 per meeting) was discussed. MAG agreed that its members with poor attendance records should be approached and asked to defer their membership until they could participate more regularly. Implicit in this was recognition of the fact that the Directorates and O/DCI should not nominate members to MAG who could not participate regularly for such reasons as job pressures, external training, sabbaticals, and lengthy internal training.
- c. MAG addressed the problem of its own productivity. Its members acknowledged difficulties in setting aside sufficient time for in-depth research and writing, a situation which was manifested more often as the year progressed in papers where ideas and concepts took precedence over careful wording and format. MAG recognized the importance of deadlines and agreed to employ them more stringently with each project.
- d. MAG was unanimous in its desire that there be a more consistent, regular response on the part of senior management to the ideas and recommendations sent forward. Many times MAG learns that a suggestion has reached the appropriate office, but is not subsequently informed about its reception.
- e. All who participated in the [] session felt it was very worthwhile. It afforded the opportunity to address MAG matters in a manner free from the time and energy constraints attendant in the customary after-hours meetings at Headquarters. There is sentiment in MAG favoring a one- or two-day meeting away from Headquarters each time a new group of members joins MAG.

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Management Advisory Committee

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18 NOV 1979

A

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller

SUBJECT : MAG Recommendation on Agency-wide Selection-Out Procedures


1. The Clandestine Service has now had almost a year's experience in effecting its promotions through impartial panel reviews of every officer's file at each grade. The panels also identify a low percentile of officers in each grade; repetition of this finding by a subsequent panel of entirely different membership subjects the officer to administrative action.
2. MAG understood you to say in your meeting with us on 29 October that the Agency intends to adopt this procedure in all directorates, but that there are no plans to enforce its select-out feature in the other directorates which are not overstrength.
3. MAG urges reconsideration of this decision. We think staying within T/O ceilings and maintaining a quality officer corps are two separate issues. Any organization needs pruning of its marginal employees to maintain its health. The CS would have profited from its present selection-out procedure years ago when it was still growing. We are the only intelligence service in Washington without some form of accepted procedure for selection-out. We believe we owe ourselves a regularized pruning procedure in all directorates and all our officers a clear understanding of how this process will be effected.
4. This recommendation was unanimously endorsed on 17 November by MAG members from all directorates.

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[Redacted Signature]

MAG Co-chairman

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

18 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : The Agency's Image

1. In mid-May the Director asked the MAG to review the Agency's image and to inform him through you of our findings and recommendations. Since that time we have interviewed a number of agency officials about this matter, and have spent additional time in discussion and review among ourselves. Our major conclusion is, perhaps, too obvious: that the Agency's image is determined mainly by the quality of its work. No amount of public relations can hide or offset the damage done our reputation by poor analysis, sloppy operations, or other forms of ineptitude. This study does not specifically address the problem of achieving excellence. Rather it concentrates on communication.

2. In the main, our discussions have revealed a balance sheet with regard to the Agency's image. Due largely to the emergence of new values among the young, and to some extent within the general public, our share of professionals drawn from the nation's colleges is significantly reduced, and our recruiters operate almost in stealth around campus fringes. The fact that there is so little information about either the intelligence profession or CIA available to the public gives the moderate person little knowledge against which to evaluate the sensational charges sometimes made against us. There is room for improvement in our relations with the State and Defense Departments, And we

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see some danger to our good standing with Congress in the President's tendency to use the Agency covertly in unpopular causes.

3. The balance sheet is not all red ink, however. We understand that at present our relations with Congress and the White House are sound. Recent efforts by the media to involve the Agency in "hot" press issues have had short-term impact, at most. The monthly flow of unsolicited professional applicants for employment greatly exceeds our hiring capacity. And business, alienated somewhat by the National Student Association expose, is again cooperating in furnishing both non-official cover and useful information.

4. We recognize that present policy is aimed at keeping the CIA profile as low as possible, and that our public relations posture is fundamentally defensive. We endorse this policy as preferable to an all-out public relations offensive. Yet, we believe that it would be both prudent and possible to build greater public knowledge and acceptance of the intelligence profession and of CIA's role in the government through a program of "institutional advertising". If such a course were adopted it might provoke some public reaction (especially media reaction), but within broad limits such a response should be tolerated rather than feared.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. We believe that the Agency's image would be aided by two kinds of publications. The first, a general statement which described how the CIA fits into the spectrum of government activities, would include a brief history of the events which caused CIA to be created, an analytical/reporting statement of the laws governing our activities, a description of our relationship to other intelligence agencies, and documentation about the strict controls placed upon our activities by both the legislative and executive branches of government. This study would be an inexpensive reference work for distribution by the Government Printing Office to libraries, scholars, or the curious public. The second publication we suggest is an authoritative study of the Intelligence Community. This

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work should be written by a scholar doing independent research for an organization such as the Brookings Institution. It could be a book, a monograph, or a chapter in a textbook.

B. It would be most helpful if the PFIAB would make an annual, low key public report about the intelligence community as a whole, with occasional more detailed reports on the various components.

C. The PFIAB should encourage the Smithsonian Institution to develop an "Intelligence Exhibit" which traces the role of intelligence from the Revolution to the satellite. It should be a broadly focused exhibit which also portrays the gathering of data by businesses, banks, and scholars in order that they can function more effectively and act more wisely. A short film in conjunction with such an exhibit would be an effective way to use the motion picture medium. Beyond suggesting this project and giving limited research support, the hand of the intelligence community should not be visible.

D. Encourage selected Agency retirees to write articles about their experiences for high quality magazines and journals. Topics might include the ways in which information and analysis were used at times of great national tension, a description of the demands and deadlines faced by the various offices, or our role as a "think tank". Some articles from past issues of Studies in Intelligence should be considered for general release.

E. Encourage employees who are not under cover to attend meetings of professional societies without even informally trying to hide their place of employment. In the same vein, we recommend wider contact between Agency scholars and those outside through Agency-sponsored conferences on special subjects. And we believe that broader substantive exchanges with members of the business community -- both in the US and with US company officials overseas -- would be beneficial to both participants.

F. The Agency's summer intern program should be continued, with even greater emphasis upon its good management. Interns should have broad exposure to CIA's best work.

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G. Increase the distribution of clearly identified Agency reference materials which are unique. Map folios have been well received by schools and scholars, and we should make available other fruits of our research such as basic economic analysis on selected areas.

H. Continue to deal with the press through background briefings when appropriate. Encourage press analysts to exchange their views and insights on a wide variety of subjects with us, perhaps in a manner similar to OTR's recent presentation of Richard Scammon and other outside speakers.

I. Develop substantive seminars about CIA's role in the government for representatives of other agencies with whom we deal in the field. Promote the idea that we all work for the same government, with ultimate direction from the same set of superiors.

J. Internally, continue the State of the Agency address, widening its effect by producing a transcript for the perusal of employees who cannot attend. Encourage more open intra-directorate communication in the mode of the State of the Agency address, so that employees will be able to see, hear, and query their deputy directors on matters important mainly to their own components. Whenever possible, encourage the members of the top management to make some contact with their employees in the areas where they actually work. A Deputy Director should be known as a person, not as a designator on an office door.

K. Finally, the DCI is a public figure and should have at least occasional structured exposure outside the White House and the committees of Congress. We are confident that he would be well received at an occasional prestigious speaking engagement or in a television interview conducted by a sophisticated journalist. Allen Dulles' hour on television was a distinct plus for the intelligence profession, we believe, in its philosophical tour d'horison.

THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

24 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : The Agency's Supervision and Management Courses

After a review of the office of training's present and proposed supervision and management courses MAG feels that the present OTR plans are in the right direction. These plans should be reinforced with the endorsement of Agency management. The following proposals are offered:

1. The OTR plan to merge the present two courses on supervision and management should be endorsed. This would reduce the regular management courses from five to four.
2. All the recommendations listed under "Problems Relative to Supervision and Management Courses", which is part of an OTR planning paper should be endorsed (see attachment).
3. The suggestion that MAG act as an advisory body is accepted, but MAG would propose that all Agency management have an input into what OTR is teaching its new and potential managers.
4. The OTR program of course seminars should include some of the more practical problems encountered by supervisors, i.e., fitness reports, promotion policy, regulations, IG functions, employee counseling, medical services, planning, programing, and budgeting. Some of these topics may require clarifying Agency policy concerning them, but this in itself would be helpful.

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ATTACHMENT

Problems Relative to Supervision and Management Courses

- I. For most courses the instructors can look to established doctrine, policy, practice, etc., for guidance on course content. If these are lacking, there is at least a specific segment of the Agency which has a clear need for the course and which, to a reasonable extent, can provide objectives. Our Management and Supervision Courses do not have this guidance. To compound the problem, feedback on the utility of our Management and Supervision Courses is virtually non-existent.

Recommendations:

Designate or establish a group outside of OTR, and representing the Agency as a whole (perhaps the MAG), to act as an advisory body with respect to course content, ensuring consonance between that content and Agency policy and practice.

- II. It appears that more often than not the students who attend our Supervision and Management courses are doing so at a point in their career which militates against their deriving maximum benefit from the training, i.e., after bad habits have become too entrenched to be eradicated.

Recommendations:

- A. Establish an Agency policy requiring supervisory personnel to attend basic supervisory training within a specified time span covering, say, from six months prior to being made a supervisor to six months after such action.
- B. Encourage continuing education of supervisory personnel by establishing and advertising a program of courses, seminars, etc., (both internal and external) which such personnel should attend at some point over the course of their career as supervisors.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director

SUBJECT: Recommendation on Lengthening the Employee Probationary Period

CIA officers enjoy, in fact if not in theory, virtually unparalleled job security. They do not face the service officers' maximum time-in-grade hurdles nor the periodic competitive weeding out FSO's undergo.

There is one time only in his career when the inept CIA employee faces any real prospect of discharge: during his first or probationary year. Having survived 365 days, he is safe against all but the grossest offenses against security, decorum, or the law.

The Agency, traditionally very chary of exercising the DSI's statutory authority to make summary dismissals, has only proved willing to discharge the inept or miscast employee during his probationary year. In the last five years an average of [REDACTED] new employees were so separated each year. In contrast, virtually none were discharged during this five years after their probationary periods had been completed.

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The Agency seems content, and perhaps is morally obligated, to carry to retirement eligibility the formerly able officer who peaked after 15 years and is coasting. It correctly feels no similar obligations to the new officer who usually has minimal family obligations and a minuscule investment of tenure in his intelligence career.

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Despite the best of screening aids, hiring mistakes are inevitable. Many new employees themselves recognize mistaken career choices, and the greatest percentage of resignations in Agency professional ranks occur during the first five years of employment.

The Agency gives itself only a year to recognize and correct such hiring mistakes. ISG believes this time is clearly too short. OS's are still in training status when the year has expired (and are often receiving protective performance evaluations and "extra help" from their counselors.) LEP officers are still busily infusing documents in RMD and dreaming of a future OS career. OS careerists can be evaluated fully only on their field performance, and few are lucky enough to escape desk servitude within a year.

ISG finds cumbersome, unnecessary, and possibly disadvantageous the suggestion of hiring new employees under contract. The paperwork is unnecessary, and the Agency's primary recruiting theme - "a career in intelligence" - becomes a bit hollow when followed by a contract offer with the standard 30-day notice clause. Adoption of such a practice would undoubtedly put us at a hiring disadvantage.

The contract suggestion rests in fact on recognition that Agency management has grown accustomed to letting contracts lapse but has shied away from firing staffers. It is thus in essence a dodge to circumvent traditional attitudes and practices.

Why not, instead, change practice? There is no statutory bar to CIA's setting any probationary period it wishes for new employees. ISG advocates adopting a five-year probationary period, with rigorous, competitive weeding-out hazards to be faced at the end of the third and fifth years.

This proposal parallels roughly the Macomber task force recommendations for fairly ruthless competitive selection out of less promising junior PSOs. It assumes that marginality can be detected fairly early in a career. (There is good

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difficulties for this, in, among, other places, the results of the 5% evaluation process.) It seems as that surgery is better and more humane early in a career than later. It holds the promise of better career mobility and of better future cuts in the established civilian corps. It permits us to pick a greater infusion of new blood.

MIC advocates competitive ranking of new employees in each directorate and the automatic discharge at the end of three years of the lowest 20% and at the end of five years of another 5%. (There is nothing sacrosanct about the percentage cuts recommended but we think their logic can be supported. The 5% Evaluation Boards are having little difficulty identifying a marginal 5% at each grade among more senior officers and we think the rationale of a probationary period argues for more rigorous pruning than at mid-career.)

We suggest this procedure because the firing decision is always a painful one. No "scrupulous" supervisor wants to document the record, write the fatal recommendation, nor face down an irate employee. It is easier to try to palm off a marginal employee on another shop. The fixed percentage requirement avoids all this and ensures that the non-competitive officer is impartially identified and acted against. The two-stage procedure should permit some career experimentation and the rehabilitation of employees possibly miscast in one directorate but entirely competitive in another.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

1 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Agency Organization/Reorganization

Given the increasing complexities and costs of national intelligence programs, MAG believes that the DCI should exercise more positive coordination of such activities. This is in line with his authority under section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, and apparently was reinforced by President Nixon's Memorandum of 24 March 1969, to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Chairman of PFIAB. We believe that now is the time for a bold restructuring of national intelligence activities, in a manner similar to the reorganization of the Cabinet proposed by the White House. We recognize that managing the community is a formidable task, but given current program scope, costs, manpower levels and attendant inefficiencies, it must be faced. For example,

a) The management of resources for overhead reconnaissance, is not under effective DCI control.

b) NSA's overcollection and the inability of either the whole community or NSA to profitably exploit data received in such volume continues to be a problem.

c) Too many clandestine HUMINT operations are run by the military after only pro-forma coordination with CIA. Often they are at the expense of the national interest.

d) Production of what amounts to finished intelligence by non-USIB agencies, such as ARPA, duplicates what is already done in greater detail by CIA and DIA.

e) The position of DIA within the DOD is uncertain, and its effectiveness in controlling the military intelligence services is uneven.

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MAG believes that increased coordination of all national intelligence resources must be exercised in order to obtain maximum return from approved national programs. In view of the nation's shifting domestic priorities and demands, the intelligence community must carefully focus its attention on only major intelligence needs, and be prepared to handle them with decreased funding and manpower. MAG recommends:

- 1) That the DCI serve as the principal witness at all congressional hearings about appropriations for U.S. intelligence activities, including those conducted by the DOD.
- 2) That the NIPE and NIRB be combined and strengthened.
- 3) That the DCI should use the NIPE/NIRB to document the need for bold change, and then seek implementing directives from the NSC and the White House.

An optimal internal Agency organization cannot be fully developed until the intelligence community is brought under more centralized control.

AGENCY REORGANIZATION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAG believes that there can be some realignment of the internal agency organization which will bring about a clearer definition of functions and missions. These changes are not suggested for the sake of change alone. They arise out of our recognition that some groupings of offices include multiple functions (i.e., collection, analysis, production and support) which would be more effectively handled under another system of organization.

B. MAG proposes a more functional organization -- a directorate for production and analysis, a directorate for collection, a directorate for support, and a directorate for the clandestine service which is essentially the same as the present DDP. The functions performed by the current DDS&T would be redistributed among these four major components. Following are MAG's proposed changes.

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II. INTER-DIRECTORATE REORGANIZATION

A. Combine all offices currently involved with production, i.e., OCI, OER, OSR, OEGI, OSI, and FMSAC into a single directorate. NPIC, IAS, and CRS should also be included because of their close support for production. This directorate could retain the name DDI.

B. Establish a staff in the DDI composed of some analysts from each of the above offices to produce all current intelligence. Personnel might serve on this Current Intelligence Staff (CIS) for regular tours, returning afterward to a DDI office. The component now called the Office of Current Intelligence would become the Office of Political Intelligence (OPI), and its personnel would serve rotational tours on the CIS just as other DDI analysts would.

C. Transfer FBIS to USIA, or in some way make it independent of control by the intelligence community.

D. Establish a Directorate for Collection consisting of OSA and SPS (merged), OEL, OSP, DCS, and IRS. Leave overseas HUMINT collection with the Clandestine Service.

E. Transfer OCS to the DDS.

F. Transfer ORD to the DCI area under a special assistant for Research and Development.

III. INTRA-DIRECTORATE REORGANIZATION

A. Insure that EOI will be under the Agency's control (the new DDI or the new DD/Collection), and that adequate physical facilities be made available for EOI at Langley.

B. Within the Clandestine Service, examine the missions, staffing, and the need for the senior staffs. Are such posts sinecures for time-servers and problem cases? Consider, for example, the abolition of FI/OPS and CI/OPS, and the assignment of some of their functions to the area divisions.

C. The CS should adopt a centrally directed assignment system, possibly administered by an expanded PMS rather than the CSPS. Such action would meet the foreseen need for greater flexibility in the assignment of personnel overseas.

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D. Further steps should be taken to expand the approval and discretionary authority of CS division chiefs in such matters as project renewals, absences from post for chiefs of station, granting of representational allowances, and granting operational approvals. (The conflict between this recommendation and MAG's preference for stronger central authority over the intelligence community is more apparent than real. This recommendation is for delegation of authority within a single system where central control exists and can be reasserted once delegated. That description could not apply to the intelligence community.)

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E. Merge Central Cover Staff and [REDACTED]
Division.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

31 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT: The Removal of Barrier Areas in Headquarters Building

MAG believes that the COMINT barriers (the All Source Center and the IDP/SI/D area) in the Headquarters Building are no longer the optimum system for the protection of COMINT material. They are inefficient, costly to operate, a safety hazard, and are a hindrance to communication. MAG understands that studies were made by the Office of Security and by the Building Security Committee, in which both recommended the elimination of the barriers with a substitution of compartmented areas. The proposal is not without some problems, but they can be resolved. MAG believes that the recommendations are in the best interest of the Agency and suggests that the remaining steps be taken to put them into effect as soon as practical.

THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

GROUP 1
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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This Notice Expires 1 April 1972

MANAGEMENT

15 March 1971

THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP

1. In June 1969 the Director established the Management Advisory Group (MAG) on an experimental basis. It was formed to provide an additional vehicle for advice and assistance and in no way replaces command and staff assistance available to the Director. Since its inception, MAG has demonstrated its utility by making a number of suggestions which have been favorably acted upon.
2. MAG is composed of fourteen officers who serve a one-year tour. There are three members selected from each directorate and two from the DCI area. The members are chosen from the age group 30 to 45, and from GS grades 12 through 16. Tours are staggered to ensure continuity of effort. Meetings of the whole group are held after hours twice or more each month.
3. MAG has no formal production responsibilities. It is free to meet as often as it wishes and request any speaker or written material pertinent to its work; it reports to the Director via the Executive Director-Comptroller. Its primary purpose is to render an advisory service to management by identifying and making recommendations about issues and problems arising out of the Agency's organization and practices. Some of the matters recently addressed by MAG have included the Agency's image, personnel policies such as promotion rates and retirement procedures, the need for better communication between management and all employees (e.g., the State of the Agency Message), and the possible duplication of some functions between directorates.
4. To widen its information base, MAG solicits the views and suggestions of Agency employees. MAG would not be the appropriate body to hear specific personal employee grievances since there are grievance procedures already available. Rather, MAG seeks ideas which would improve the quality of the Agency's performance by affecting its personnel, its structure and methods of operation, or its external relations.
5. An employee wishing to make a suggestion should send it to MAG, 7-D-59 Headquarters. Suggestions or ideas will be picked up by the current MAG chairman. The employee may also wish to contact a MAG member within his directorate. All contributions will be given due consideration and their authorship will be kept confidential to the extent that the contributor desires.

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

MANAGEMENT

15 March 1971

6. Operating Officials and supervisors are urged to circulate this notice among their employees.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

JOHN W. COFFEY
Deputy Director
for Support

DISTRIBUTION: AB